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## **Hand-sight – kinaesthetic perception beyond visual categories**

Humans relate to movement through an unsettling dichotomy of perception and sensation. On one hand, the experience of movement seems to be informed by visual perception. An example: while looking out of the window of a train, we find out it is moving when the trees and houses start to move themselves, lets us say, from left to right, being replaced by new ones which seem to follow in the same direction.

On the other hand, movement is something that happens to our body, a translation of sorts that manifests itself in more subtle ways: tension, weight shift, gravity, overall perception of our body's geometry and loss of stationary qualities. Even though this dichotomy seems to be usually tame and lacking in perplexity in our everyday experience, some particular situations seem to denounce an unfair tendency of the perception of movement being mainly understood as shifting visual categories.

Considering film as an example: a friend of mine once complained how the use of too much handheld camera in the Danish Dogma 95 films made her feel vertigo. She told me it was as if someone was rattling her head, shaking it upwards, backwards and sideways. In her account, she seemed oblivious to the fact that handheld literally means held by hand, and she spoke of her uneasiness as if it were a phenomenon that had purely to do with her eyes.

It is true that most of us, while undergoing the experience of watching a film, perceive our situation as that of characters in Kathryn Bigelow's 1995 *Strange Days*, where by using a virtual reality recorder that capture image directly from subjects' cerebral cortex, one could experience any situation through the eyes of the one living it. We usually assume that the camera's point of view is directly superimposed on our eyes. But in my friend's case, how can purely visual phenomena produce vertigo in the body? An actual and acute perception of displacement, of unwarranted movement?

By merely considering the practical names of some of the most typical camera movements (tilting, panning, travelling, steady cam, still shot, etc.) we see how visual motion is referred to by using verbs that imply the displacement of the body, or lack thereof, either as a whole or as an articulated synthesis. Beyond the scope of film we find other more radical instances (such as Stendhal Syndrome or epilepsy caused by exposure to stroboscopic lighting) of the way in which the visual seems to feed directly into a sensation of how the body is felt, while exposed to movement.

This paper, using mostly filmic examples due to the consideration of the cinematic process as privileged instance of the referred dichotomy, focuses on how the perception of movement, mostly relying on visual categories, is in fact underlining an intense positioning of the performing, sensing body beyond visual perception as the main avatar of kinaesthetic experience.

Several aesthetic manifestations fuel this analysis: from early film chronophotographers such as Muybridge and Marey to Aleksandr Sokurov's "Russian Ark" one shot achievement, from Japanese Butoh theatre's use of microrhythms to contemporary mobile phone videography, from Maya Deren's film choreography to the moving eye-body complex in the works of Buster Keaton and Dziga Vertov.

**Eeva Anttila**  
**Theatre Academy**

## **Mind the body: Unearthing the affiliation between the conscious body and the reflective mind**

In this presentation, I will outline the major theoretical and methodological foundations of my a research project that focused on the following question: What kinds of mental reflections does bodily presence generate? The study is based on a presupposition that bodily knowledge and mental reflections are intertwined, and that it is possible to facilitate their relationship. The extent to which it is possible to become aware of some processes that we usually do not attend to in everyday life, as well as the meanings that our prereflective, or bodily experiences generate when attended to are the focus of this study.

In an attempt to facilitate internal awareness, I developed a method based on introspection, and combined it with bodily movement, and reflective writing. Shortly stated, introspection means observing the inner reality that positivist science refused to accept as a part of physical reality. This methodology and its theoretical premises that link neural and phenomenological structures are recently being employed by a growing number of scholars. This reflects a growing interest in multidisciplinary approaches in studying human existence and, e.g., bodily knowledge.

The data collected for this study includes written reflections from five female dance professionals, aged 30-40 years. Through a qualitative thematic analysis, I arrived at eleven categories and that form four themes: observing, thinking, sensing and connecting. In my presentation I will briefly discuss these themes, but most importantly, I will describe the qualities of mental reflections that arose from bodily presence and an apparent ease and swiftness of the movement between different ways of perceiving, sensing and thinking. Our inner life seems to be spontaneous yet purposeful at the same time, and our experiences and meanings that arise resemble improvisation where surprise and purpose become

intertwined. At the same time, an intricate interplay between the outer and inner worlds evolves into a multilayered fabric with different contours, colours and shapes.

This study illuminates the dynamic movement, or “heavy traffic” that goes on between our conscious thought and bodily experiences. It seems to me that the nature of this movement itself is still vaguely understood, and that we have not even begun to appreciate the richness of meanings that are being generated through it. In closing, I will discuss how the study can also be conceived as a window on what dancers know. Dancers know through their bodies and about their bodies. They seem to be able to access the prereflective realm quite easily, and generate rich meanings and varied mental reflections based on their bodily experiences. Moreover, often these reflections are poetic and metaphoric in nature, and are related to existential questions and complex issues related to oneself, others and the world.

**Anneli Arho**  
**Sibelius Academy**

## **A composer of music and the Aristotelian heritage**

The sense of the good and the valuable in music develops within a culture in such a way that a composer of music is seldom aware of the origins of her or his “bon goût”. Recently, I have familiarized myself with theoretical and practical writings concerning music from the 15th to 18th centuries, and since then I have been deconstructing my preferences and reconstructing the image of my own musical background.

Many theoretical and practical writings from the earlier centuries display notions and conceptions on music which apparently have their origins in Aristotle’s texts: “the evidence suggest that it [harmonic progression as a directed motion] became available to Western music theory as a direct consequence of the rise of Aristotelian thought, particularly his metaphysics and natural science, in the scholasticism of the thirteenth century”. (Cohen, David E.: “The Imperfect Seeks Its Perfection: Harmonic Progression, Directed Motion, and Aristotelian Physics.” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/745984>, accessed: 16/6/2008.)

Also, Johannes Tinctoris in his *Liber de arte contrapuncti* (1477) states that “variety must be most accurately sought for in all counterpoint”. He refers to Horace, Tullius, and Aristotle, “who in his Ethics, does not hesitate to state that variety is a most pleasant thing and human nature in need of it”. (Tinctoris 1961, 139 : *The Art of Counterpoint*. American Institute of Musicology.)

The principle of *varietas* and the idea of directed motion are both essential aspects of the Western musical tradition, and they both are intended to move

human beings. In the 20th century these foundations were shaken e.g. by intrusion of slowly transforming insistent repetitions and static sound fields. In my presentation the Aristotelian thought – as presented in theoretical and practical writings – is intertwined with my own experience as a composer of music.

**Helena Dahlberg**

**Department for history of ideas and theory of science, Gothenburg University, Sweden**

## **On movement and stillness**

My point of departure in this paper is Henri Bergson's essay *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic*, where he opposes the living as that which is constantly changing to the mechanical as that which fails to adapt or that which keeps repeating itself. The living body is then something like perfect litheness or pliability, constantly moving and adapting to its surroundings, and moreover: the living seems to be that which is constantly on the alert, always prepared to take one way rather than the other. In contrast to this, the mechanical within the living is that which lags behind, that which falls out of the movement, or simply that which does not fit. The comic is precisely the revelation of this mechanical component within the living, a disruption in the otherwise beautifully moving body: suddenly someone trips and falls on his behind, and the body reveals itself in all its clumsiness. Bergson thus opposes the principle of life - vitality - to that which is weight and resistance, something which nevertheless seems to be a part of the living body. How can one explain that the living comes to life only in the body, in short, that all living creatures are bodily? Is this material body only the other side of life, something which life must pass through? Or is this body part of life itself?

My paper then moves on to Sartre's description of desire and flesh in the third part of *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre opposes the active and the passive body in a way very similar to Bergson; for example he describes his view of a person walking from behind: what he sees is not only the active movement that the legs are making but also certain "involuntary waddlings of the rump". The rump is then "like an isolated cushion which is carried by the legs and the balancing of which is a pure obedience to the laws of weight." In Sartre's description, human being is characterized as that which is constantly on the move, trying to become something else or someone else. Movement gives human being her justification: in the movement nothing "falls behind" but everything is oriented towards the goal that you want to achieve, and everything that you are, is justified because of this goal. How then, should one treat the waddling rump? Is it to be thought of as a pure thing, having nothing to do with movement and life?

Finally I will find in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy a possibility to think life, not as movement per se, but as the play between these two principles - movement and

stillness, awareness and oblivion, lightness and weight. According to Merleau-Ponty, the immobile is not to be thought of as foreign to movement, but to that which stays still. In the same way I argue that movement might in fact be made possible through a coming to terms with that which is not moving.

**Charlotta Palmstierna Einarsson, PhD student**  
**Department of English**

## **The centrality of movement in Samuel Beckett's works**

In Beckett's works, the body and movement are the prerequisites for being and cognition. What the characters actually do or do not do in terms of physical movement is therefore as important as what they say, yet there has been a tendency within Beckett criticism to focus more on what is said than what is done. This paper aims to redress the balance by analyzing and exploring the nature of Beckett's kinetic art in his oeuvre.

In both Beckett's prose and plays, a large amount of the text is devoted to descriptions and explanations of physical movements and, especially in the prose, to discussions regarding their significance. Interestingly, the explanations of movement in the prose texts reveal that Beckett's use of movement is fairly consistent. For example, the discussion regarding a specific physical movement in Beckett's trilogy *Molloy*, *Malone Dies*, and *The Unnamable*, may, when applied to one of the plays, provide a "gloss" that explains the use of the same movement in that play and thus shed new light on the play in question. The elaborate explanations of movements that are found in the prose texts also reveal a lack of relation between what may be considered to be the purpose of a movement and its particular mode of execution. Even the common assumption that there is a purpose to every movement does not hold true for Beckett's characters, who do not move to fulfill a purpose or make this purpose the reason for performing that movement.

Furthermore, Beckett's works frequently present characters that "mis-move", e.g. have a tendency to walk in a strange or peculiar way so that the walking falls slightly short of what would normally be expected. Such mis-movement while drawing attention to its execution, are presenting not only the idiosyncrasy of the character but also making explicit how inevitable assumptions about the purpose and meaning of the movement are, for the characters' mis-movement indicates how inappropriate such a movement would be in order to attain what seems to be its apparent purpose.

Although many of Beckett's characters seem to be performing a series of meaningless movements, the manner of their execution remains and can be analysed. Thus how a certain movement is performed becomes significant in itself.

In developing a theoretical framework for the analysis of how movements are performed in dance, Rudolf Laban, asserts the importance of effort and quality to the execution of movement and foregrounds the elements of space, time and weight as aspects of movement that are important for being and cognition. Laban's categories may be usefully applied to explore and analyse the kinds of movements that recur in Beckett's work.

Beckett's unusually deliberate and specific focus upon movement in his works is extremely relevant to how human beings' immersion in life is determined by their physicality.

**Gunn Engelsrud**  
**University of Oslo**

### **Young dancers experience - an example from a contemporary dance practice**

According to the French philosopher Merleau-Ponty the capacity, even proclivity, for thinking in paradox, and integrating opposites, characterizes lifeworld research. The lived moving body is a basis for thinking in paradoxes and the living moving body has by its fundamental ambiguity also capacity to embody the contradiction of immanence and transcendence. This is chosen as a relevant perspective for experiencing movement in a contemporary dance context.

The presentation build on material from following a group of young dancers in their individual training during dance studies in Norway at The School for Contemporary Dance. Texts written by the dancers and field notes from the researcher represents the bases for the presentation, which is organized as a performative event that aims at actualizing the audience perception, sensations and kinaesthetic feeling. Movement as a creative tool is chosen to create access to the experience of immanence and transcendence and to illuminate the paradox as an experiential field. The aim is to manifest the bodily experience of being in the world and demonstrate its holism, making it possible to see and explore both visible and invisible phenomena, and bringing them to life through dance and movement resonating together. By listening to and following the movements as they happen continuously and precisely one can be able to differentiate different ways of mastering skills.

Dancers often, rather than articulating what they have learned, demonstrate in movement what they have achieved. This makes them able to master skills that are impressive to other people, but it also makes them vulnerable because the experience itself is exactly that—vulnerable. When the dancers have the opportunity to define their own experience, they transcend the expectations others have of them and there is more to be gained in the mutual encounters.

The crucial aspect in dance practise seems to be allowing ambiguity in the exploration of movement.

**Jeroen Fabius**  
**Amsterdam Master of Choreography**

## **Con forts fleuve. Politics of perception in the work of Boris Charmatz**

In this article I explore ways how french choreographer Boris Charmatz creates a political approach to the theatre from a materialist perspective of the body in which the senses play a key role. I do this by departing from the thinking of Hans-Thies Lehmann about the political in relation to contemporary theatre.

According to Lehmann to exploit its political potential theatre needs to engage with its own ways of presenting in order to establish conditions for true communication. This can only be done by making the use of signs transparent, i.e. the making of theatre itself, and by taking risks in dealing with what is presented. Lehmann calls this a politics of perception.

In the article I will argue that in his choreography Con forts fleuve Charmatz engages with a politics of perception by obstructing the visual as dominant mode of perception of dance. Instead sound and kinaesthesia are leading elements in a radical manipulation of the senses.

**Line Ryberg Ingerslev**  
**Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen**

## **The way we move - expressivity and interaction**

The way we move – expressivity and interaction The paper investigates the relation between expressions and interpersonal understanding. How do we share expressive space and what is it that we share? If we consider expressions as action readiness, then, the paper claims, we must be moving in a field of shared signs of possible interaction. In three steps the paper argues that expressivity is inherent to embodiment (1), which makes interpersonal interaction dependent on expressivity (2), since, otherwise action would not be understandable and interaction would be impossible (3). The idea is to underline human expressivity as an anthropological key to intersubjectivity. Expressions are not only natural and non-communicating, as when we yawn, and they are not solely cultural phenomena either, as when we put the hand in front of the mouth while yawning. On a structural level expressivity points to the way our movements connect us in patterns of intelligibility.

When we are asked, how we are aware of our bodies and what, then, we are aware of, our answers, according to Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., point towards the interplay between experiences of worldly engagement, corporality and interpersonal meaning: all of these aspects are pointed at, when we use the notion of embodiment. Following Gibbs the body as experienced engagement, is experienced in its vitality and in its activity; as experienced corporality the body appears as object and as instrument, and as interpersonal meaning the body is experienced as appearance and as an expression of self. What this means, is not only that the notion of the embodiment is important in a variety of fields because of its subjective, interpersonally shared, cultural, physical and mental aspects, but also that the way we experience our bodies holds a certain key to the investigation of all these fields.

The paper investigates the relation between expressions and interpersonal understanding in the attempt to get hold of what part expressions play when we interact and understand each other. Two questions will be guiding the paper: how do we share expressive space and what is it that we share? The first question we will consider by investigating the expressive body and the second by looking role of the other expressive bodies.

If we grant that expressions are states of action readiness, as Nico Fridja claims, we will be led to a notion of expressive space. If further we find it that the body is characterized as a double bound self relation, where we are aware of both biologically having and culturally being a body, expressivity is already inherent to embodiment, in the sense that the self relation is the reason why we are expressive, as the German philosopher Helmuth Plessner held it. There is a non-conceivability for us to our own bodies and an unawareness of its all time presence as Bernhard Waldenfels describes it, and these insights hold a key to our understanding of expressivity. The way we depend on the expressivity of others, when we understand each other is crucial to answering the second question: What we share in expressive space is a not yet verbal field of interpersonal meaning, and without this field prior to any language, we could not understand actions.

At the end of the paper I will spell out the relation between the “I move” and the “I express” of embodiment as a concluding remark to the former two questions, whereby I will distinguish a watered down conception of movement as being globally expressive from a fundamental understanding of expressive subjectivity, which is realized and carried out as a relation.

**Marja-Leena Juntunen**  
**Sibelius Academy**

## **Sensing and expressing qualities of music through the moving body**

In Dalcroze Eurhythmics music is approached through body movement and bodily experiences. In this approach to music education that was devised by Emile Jaques-Dalcroze (1865-1950), students are, for example, guided to respond to music through movement in space. The movements aim to reflect listening to music so that the qualities of movement (speed, energy, intensity, direction, etc.) correspond as closely as possible to the qualities of the music heard.

The paper examines the process of listening and expressing music through the moving body. More specifically, I ask: How can the qualities of music be explored, sensed and expressed through the moving body and what is the role of kinaesthesia in this process? These questions will be approached both philosophically and with some reference to practical implications. The philosophical framework is based on phenomenology, especially on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment.

In order to become aware of the quality of the body movement, one has to become sensitive to and be aware of one's movements and of their attributes. This happens through 'listening' to kinaesthetic sensations, through what Jaques-Dalcroze and Merleau-Ponty called the sixth sense. Learning from movement requires heightened kinaesthetic awareness that can be awakened through various exercises. Listening to music through the moving body happens with the whole self, attuned through the entire body of felt experience. When musical listening is understood as 'felt' through the whole body, we find in listening the reversibility, a sense of a 'double belongingness' that implies that music is simultaneously both heard and felt. Applying Merleau-Ponty's notion of gesture to situations where musical sounds are expressed through the moving body, I conclude that listening to music is thinking and the body movement that results is a completed emotion or thought. Thus, listening and moving inform each other simultaneously.

**Hanna Järvinen**  
**The Theatre Academy**

## **Historicising Kinaesthesia and Perception**

"But can it be doubted, that motors and aeroplanes do have an effect on the known changes in the entire psyche of contemporary man, that the rapid speed of technological progress in our days should answer for the kind of general

nervousness, a tension in the entire cultural atmosphere that surrounds us? Is it a surprise, that the qualities of the latter should in the end resonate even in that which is farthest removed from all kinds of technology, that which is freest from the influence of the motors and aeroplanes, the strings of our souls, namely, the secret feelings of artistic creativity and perception?" Vyacheslav Karatygin in Rech 16.2./1.3.1914.

For this conference, I propose to bring in a historian's critical view on the centrality of motion as a discourse. As the Russian music critic Vyacheslav Karatygin commented in his review of the first Russian concert performance of Igor Stravinsky's *The Rite of Spring*, contemporary physical experience of speed, of new perspectives enabled by technologies such as the aeroplane, would inevitably affect the arts as well. Based on the work of Henri Bergson and his contemporaries, I argue that during the so-called long nineteenth century, various cultural changes in industrialised Europe drew attention to the human body in motion in new and interesting ways, culminating in a new philosophy of time and perception.

As Alain Corbin has argued, what we perceive has changed how we perceive and perception cannot be equated with what of that perception is narrated for others. In my recent work on historicising perception, I have argued that realising the historical difference in how we perceive (e.g. as a short child vs. as a tall adult) is crucial to our process of analysing remembering and consequently, to the process of historiography. Without an understanding of corporeal historical differences, the materiality of experience, we cannot realise our own genealogical formation as scholars. The danger is to fall prey to the phenomenological universal, to think all people everywhere experience in the same way and articulate those experiences in the same way. Rather, I would utilise phenomenological insights to criticise disciplines such as history for forgetting the importance of corporeal experience. Perhaps, as scholars, our being-towards-death is a realisation that our work is conditioned by the past rather than the future towards which we desire to orientate it.

**Päivi Järviö**  
**Docmus Unit, Sibelius Academy, Finland**

### **The singing body as interior movement – making audible the non-representative**

I see and hear her singing. She is standing almost still. Her mouth forms words, her arms move slightly, and her head turns as she addresses her singing to the listeners. Every now and then she shifts her weight from one foot to the other. I can see no other movement in her. As her voice reaches me I am moved by her singing. I am singing. I lean my singing against my body, sensing myself move as an integrated whole in the music, as the music. My life given to me to be lived

occurs in me in a singular way one mode of which is singing. I am my singing – there is no distance between my singing and me.

The singing body is a body skilled in interior movement. The singer works with this movement and the resistance felt in her body trying to connect to the whole of her singing body, to all her experience and knowledge of this repertoire and its performing practice. Simultaneously, numerous other, maybe already forgotten things that have entered her living body during her life can become meaningful in her singing.

The voice of the singer can make audible the non-representative, hidden. The overwhelming power of life in the singer is turned into sound, thrown forward, pressed out into the open (ex-primis;) as a cultivated cry freeing the singer of the burden of the force of life. The sound of the voice in the body of the singer and of the listeners is a vibrating trace of the invisible, the immediate result of the power in the singing body.

With the French phenomenologist Michel Henry, I discuss singing so called early music using my own experience of a singer and pedagogue as my material. My focus is on the Orfeo (1607) of Claudio Monteverdi, especially on the recitative of Messaggiera, the messenger. The main characteristic of this kind of early baroque recitative is that it is sung speech rather than singing.

The singer slowly carves this sung speech into her singing body, tasting the various meanings of the text, chewing the sounds of the words, trying the resistance of her singing body, testing the sound of her voice, leaning to the dissonances in the melody, gasping for air in the agitated flood of words, sensing the silences as stopping or movement. As her body starts to move with this speech it becomes her speech making audible the invisible/inaudible movement of her life.

**Mikko Kahri**  
**University of Helsinki, Department of Sociology**

### **On the production of shared rhythm in the interaction between a four to six months old baby and her mother**

The presentation investigates the relations between the rhythm of the movements of a four to six months old baby and the speech of her mother during a few short sequences of interaction (all together about one minute in length).

First it is noted that changes in the baby's movements are, like W.S. Condon and his associates (e.g., Condon and Sander 1974) claimed in the 1970's, often quite simultaneous with the changes in the speech of her mother. (However, the baby's movements are continuous, which makes defining the exact moments of

their change impossible; see Dowd and Tronick 1986). Then it is noted that the mother, too, moves in rhythm with her own speech, and that the baby's movements, that are synchronous with her mother's speech, at times trace patterns that are similar to the patterns produced by the movements of her mother. Also, the mother's hands move and tap the baby rhythmically – in synchrony with her speech. This too may help to transmit the mother's speech rhythm to the movements of the baby.

Finally it is noted that the mother probably also adjusts her speech rhythm to the rhythm of her baby's movements. If this is so, it produces a problem for Condon's approach to the study of the relation between the rhythm of the speech of the speaker and the rhythm of the movements of the hearer (see Fogel 1993, 54–60). The mother's speech rhythm, to which the baby is supposed to be adjusting her movements, is actually adjusting to the rhythm of the baby's movements. Would it make sense to assume that a new, more successful attempt at studying the phenomena would be possible from a 'fogelian' dynamic systems point of view? What tasks does this phenomenon serve?

Condon, William and Sander, Louis (1974): Neonate movement is synchronized with adult speech: interactional participation and language acquisition. *Science* 183, 99-101. Dowd, John and Tronick, Edward (1986): Temporal Coordination of Arm Movements in Early Infancy: Do Infants Move in Synchrony with Adult Speech? *Child Development* 57, 762–776. Fogel, Alan (1993): *Developing Through Relationships. Origins of Communication, self and Culture*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

**Gunnar Karlsen**  
**Dept of Philosophy, University of Bergen**

## **Perception and self-movement**

Perception and self-movement What is the relation between the self-movement and perception? Self-movement is no doubt important in an instrumental manner; perception is a means to action and action a means to perception. In the present paper I will argue for a much stronger relation, when I explore the question from the perspective of how perception places us in proper contact with mind-independent objects and properties belonging to such. The idea that will be defended is that self-movement is a necessary and constitutive condition for a subject having a conception of objectivity and thus for perceiving objects and properties as existing unperceived.

This claim will be developed through a critical discussion of G. Strawson's thought-experiment with so-called Weather Watchers; "creatures who are constitutively incapable of behaviour or any motion whatsoever" (*Mental Reality*, OUP, 1994: 251). The argument I will present will be based on the idea that inert

perceivers like Weather Watchers are incapable of having proper spatial concepts, as it will be argued that to possess such concepts one must either be an active embodied and self-moving subject or spatial concepts must be wholly innate. The latter position will be briefly discussed and denied, and to establish the first it will be argued that inert perceivers will lack an egocentric space where spatial concepts find their meaning, and moreover, that the alternative of having spatial concepts only linked to an allocentric space is incoherent, as the very idea of an allocentric frame of reference only can be meaningful in relation to an egocentric frame of reference.

Exploring the possibility of imaginable subjects like inert perceivers will in turn help us to discuss a series of important questions on the relation between self-movement and perception, of which I will end by briefly discussing if one in working on questions like this must take into account contingent facts about human or human-like perception with the sense-modalities such creatures have, or if one can operate on the abstract level of imaginable creatures.

**Gediminas Karoblis**  
**Vytautas Magnus University**

## **Kinesthetic Education in Dancesport/Social dance**

In the collection of papers on the Philosophy of Sport Volker Caysa raises a rhetorical question: "Whether technologisation of bodily movements does not kill 'aimless' movements that give us pleasure" (Sportphilosophie, hg. von Volker Caysa, 1997, p.11). I have already argued that kinesthetic approach is extremely effective in dance classes dealing with such phenomena as controlling gaze, 'chessplay' and 'seduction' of body parts (Karoblis 2007). Now on the same basis of my experience in dancesport practices I argue that we might overcome the danger of technologisation and industrialisation of the body (see also McMains 2006) by enhancement of kinesthetic approaches and kinesthetic awareness. I also see kinesthetic education as the essential complement for biomechanical approaches in sports in general.

I will analyse current education practices in dancesport. And eventually, I will describe the most characteristic examples of kinesthetic education taken from my dance classes.

Caysa, Volker (1997). 'Vorwort.' Sportphilosophie. Hg. von Volker Caysa. Leipzig: Reclam. Karoblis, Gediminas (2007). "Controlling Gaze, Chess play and Seduction in Dance" // Janus Head. Guest ed. Shaun Gallagher. 2006/2007, Winter, p.329 - 343. McMains, Juliet (2006). Glamour Addiction: Inside the American Ballroom Dance Industry. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.

**Heli Kauppila**  
**Theatre Academy of Finland**

## **Bodily skills, ballet and Buber**

In this paper I will concentrate on the ethical dimensions in dance education. The aim is to discuss how the learning of specific, highly codified skills and the personal growth can be set as equally important bases for the dance class.

I will start by outlining what bodily awareness and bodily knowledge can mean in the context of dance pedagogy. I will then look into the ballet schooling as an example of traditionally closed and fixed system of certain aesthetics and forms. My purpose is to extend the concepts of ballet's movement and form vocabulary and to consider them in the light of first-person- approach. This shift requires also the exploration of the questions of authority, ownership and hierarchies in the ballet class. This will be scrutinized by using the ideas of encountering presented by the philosopher Martin Buber. The dialogical relationship between the teacher and the student becomes essential in this approach. I will link the learning of bodily skills to the growing sense of the self and furthermore to the awareness and sensibility towards other people and one's surroundings.

**Jaana Klevering Doctoral student, Research Associate**  
**Theatre Academy, Helsinki**

## **Dance improvisation: Movement, space and improvisational awareness**

Michel de Certeau has said that improvisation is the tactic for the poor and poetry of our own acts. He has named mundane improvisations tactical actions and politics of the margin. De Certeau offers me a way to think about improvised dance/movement as a means to construct empowered bodily agency. Beside those questions of agency that are processed in improvised performance, as a dance artist and doctoral student I am interested in asking what kind of body, movement and relation to space emerges from improvisation performances. Where does the potential of our human kinaesthesia reach in this heightened presence and self-reflective corporeality of improvisation? In improvisation there are moments where individual movement merges into collective movement of listening, seeing, breathing, resting together. As this happens it creates multiple space-place where interrelatedness between interior and exterior movement is materialized.

When articulated movement of the improviser is deeply rooted on the proprioception of the body it reveals alternative approaches to spatial embodiment. Movement that is sensitive toward the inner experience of the body and at the same time responsive to the outside of the body is not common in

every day social spaces. Kinaesthetic consciousness engages inner and outer spaces and supports communicative expressivity and spatial multi-directionality of the movement.

During the improvisation performance I won't exclude spoken language completely because my aim is to verbalize bodily experiences and spatial associations momentarily while dancing. Part of the improvisation is digital sound world that is created right at the moment by sound artist. Sound opens up another dimension of space and it affects directly to kinaesthetic sense of the dancer/mover.

**Dr. Sabine C. Koch**  
**University of Heidelberg, Germany**

### **Embodiment.**

The present research set out to consider dynamic sources of bodily feedback, starting with movement rhythms and shape as defined in the Kestenberg Movement Profile (KMP; Kestenberg et al., 1999) and their effects on the cognitive-affective system.

In a series of experiments on the influence of movement qualities and shape on cognition, affect and attitudes I investigated dynamic movement feedback from basic dimensions of movement on the cognitive-affective system; specifically, approach vs avoidance motor behaviour (Cacioppo et al., 1993), growing vs shrinking movement (shape), and smooth vs. sharp movement rhythms (qualities; Kestenberg et al., 1999).

Results suggest that movement qualities influence affect but not cognition: sharp movements caused significantly more negative affect than smooth movements. Shape had a main effect on affect and attitude: participants in the approach condition reported more positive affect and evaluated arbitrary Chinese ideographs more positive than subjects in the avoidance condition. Movement qualities moderated the influence of movement shape on affect and attitudes.

**Heikki J. Koskinen**  
**Academy of Finland / University of Helsinki**

### **The metaphysics of kinaesthesia and personhood**

Kinaesthesia refers to our awareness of the position and movement of the parts of our bodies by means of internally directed sensory organs called proprioceptors. The word comes from the Greek *kinein* 'to move' and *aisthesis* 'sensation'. Since the movement is primarily taken to occur in the body, whereas the sensation is most naturally ascribed to the mind, the word origin already

points to deep philosophical problems arising from the phenomenon of kinaesthesia.

In this paper, I will argue that such issues can be profitably viewed in the context of the metaphysics of personhood developed by the British philosopher E. J. Lowe in his book *Subjects of Experience* from 1996. In his work, Lowe does not deal with kinaesthesia or motion specifically. Therefore, part of my own contribution consists in sketching the beginnings of how the Loweian theory could be applied to the central themes of this conference.

Of course, the usefulness of the theoretical approach has to be demonstrated with reference to particular cases, and here, my focus will be twofold. On the one hand, I shall mainly concentrate on the notion of a person or a self as a psychological substance that can be a possessor of both mental and physical characteristics. This conception, it will be argued, is able to provide an adequate ontological analysis of kinaesthesia that does full justice to the aspect of movement as well as to that of sensation. On the other hand, I will also point to further topics that have to do with kinaesthetic perception, thought, imagination, and self-knowledge, characterizing the theoretical resources offered by the Loweian approach for dealing with these issues.

As a more general interdisciplinary point, this paper will present a working example of the kind of features that philosophy (and metaphysics in particular) can contribute to our overall theoretical understanding of the phenomena of kinaesthesia and motion.

**Tove Krogius-Heikel**  
**Tampereen Yliopisto**

## **The shadow's movement on the runway**

The shadow's movement on the runway. My topic is the double nature of technologically induced speed. My claim is that speed generally has a pregnant doubleness to it, and that this feature was not part of the design produced by creative engineering. On the contrary, the technologically designed speed, when realized, was designed to be controlled and progressive. From a phenomenological hermeneutic viewpoint I will try to make a preliminary sketch of the shadow of speed.

In the 1950s I am in the backseat of my father's Citroen growing up to admire speed. Later in life, I become in a sensible way more sensitive to the phenomenon of speed – as well as towards myself. The annoyance caused by speed which showed up as occasional carsickness in the little girl, grows into a cluster of sensations waking questions about the meaning and aim of the endlessly proliferating transport and transmission.

Heidegger states that our age of progress is an age of privation. I conceive Heidegger's use of this word, privation, as designating not a negation, but a lack of something. An ontological lack pointing at the shadow. In this view the shadow is a necessity for getting in touch with our reality in life. His audience, medically trained psychiatrists, have a difficulty understanding him because they are used to acknowledge the world's dimensions as always plain, open and accessible to the subject. They could as such not reckon that speed could produce dimensional pollution, the way Paul Virilio later, in his own manner, will assert.

But what is this dimensional pollution of speed? My view is that it goes together with a dimensional pollution of our selves. In this way we are the contemporary speed. But who are these selves? I do not think there is a good philosophical answer to this - unless philosophy dears to look at the self not as a detached something, and not as a general subject, but as the self of the philosopher who is doing the philosophising. In this case it is I writing this text now.

How does the double nature of speed come in here? It is to be touched through my own double nature as according to Merleau-Ponty can be stated as I – and not I. Bringing this notion further, Steven M. Rosen has recently asserted that through a generative holistic mode of phenomenology the individual as well as the universal self of the philosopher must step forward, if claiming a partaking in a holistic, dimensionally sensitive totality.

This can apply to anything in life – so how about speed. My claim is that technologically induced speed holds a record in widening the gap between I – and not I, a record in dimensional privation. This will draw up a equally big shadow on the polarity showing up as desensitisation, growing towards frozen helplessness – today the equivalent of depression. Will the philosopher also open up his depression to reach in to an understanding of technologically induced speed in its many facets. A phenomenology giving voice also to the shadow. I will make a try.

**Beatrix Lábadí**  
**Institute of Psychology, University of Pécs**

## **Body representation and spatial memory in very preterm children**

Current research suggests that preterm birth and the intensive care with tactile and kinaesthetic deprivation, in and of itself, can have important consequences for the development of different levels of body representation, especially the emerging of sensorimotor body knowledge as well as the development of spatial cognition.

The research presents here investigated the relationship between body representation and spatial memory in children at ages 3 and 4 who were low birth weight (<1000g) preterm infants (gestational age of 24-29 weeks) and typically developing full-term children (gestational age of 36-40 weeks) who were matched for IQ and chronological age. We investigated three levels of human body representation: sensorimotor, visuospatial and lexical-semantic and we also used spatial memory task.

Qualitative and quantitative data analysis indicated that children born prematurely without neurological deficit have specific difficulty in visuospatial processing and planning sensorimotor actions that are bases of different levels of body representations. The results showed significant relationship between performance of spatial memory and body representation and the duration of spending time in the incubator has impact the sensor-motor body representation. Our finding is relevant for understanding the development of bodily actions, that can integrate internal and external processes and it is crucial to creation of higher order mental functions.

**Walter Lammi**  
**The American University in Cairo**

## **Motion and soul**

When Aristotle revises his first definition of nature in terms of motion to include form that contains the principle of motion, he introduces a conundrum. Movement must stop before the 'what-is' of form if the latter is to be taken into awareness, yet the 'what-is' cannot simply mean rest, which Aristotle understands from motion, because rest no more implies awareness than does motion. Motion and awareness are incompatible.

The principle of motion is life; and of life, the soul. The soul moves by desire, which arises through imagination or phantasia. Phantasia arises by way either of thought or of sense-perception. Thought is expressly demarcated from sense-perception; in his gloss on *De Anima*, Themistius describes phantasia with a term (*methorion*) denoting an area between two bounded areas. Since, as Aristotle says, movement is continuous, this bounding represents a break in motion. At the same time, however, phantasia is itself a motion tying sense-perception to awareness and desire to thought.

The movement of phantasia does not merely connect sensation and thought, but also marks their discontinuity. It is the movement of the discontinuous. It is therefore the imperfect activity of motion, which according to Aristotle is itself an activity of the imperfect. Phantasia is the imperfection of imperfection. It interiorizes or brings the outside world into the soul, whether the material world in

sensation or the spiritual world in nous. Aristotle points out that movement is only possible against the fulcrum of rest. Incompatible though they are, rest and motion form the 'community' or koinonia of being. In phantasia the peculiar nature of that community becomes clear. On the one hand, phantasia provides geometry with its movement from image to ideal by automatically straightening the line we draw into a perfectly straight line, triangle into exact triangle, and point into vanishing mass. On the other hand, phantasia provides movement in the opposite direction, from noetic to aesthetic, in number or arithmetic. The Greeks considered the one to be the principle of number because as 'noetic matter' the one has no mass, so when divided it is the same as multiplied. As such the one provides the basis for counting. Thus the community or koinonia of mathematics, which images the community of being, is generated from the combination of noetic number moving in the direction of aesthetic object with aesthetic object of the drawn figure moving in the direction of noetic ideal. This opposition comes together in the right triangle. The reality expressed by the image of the right triangle is impossible according to any arithmetical standard, so the world expressed therein is an impossible community: the "great problem of 'incommensurability'...forces a thorough 'geometrization' on Greek mathematics." The logos has broken down.

Between rest and motion there is no 'third term', since all that is must be in rest or motion. Being must be yet cannot be the 'third term'. From the perspective of the soul, the third term is phantasia. Phantasia is movement because it "sets aesthemata to work," but phantasia has no more being than the imaginary: movement and rest 'are' being, but each 'is' not. We find that being is not one, but two; yet the two is 'one two'. Being is one and two. Aristotle had a term for this: the 'twofold in general' or 'indeterminate dyad' (aoristos dyas). The secret of phantasia's movement and with it, of movement and rest in the soul, is the aoristos dyas. Phantasia is the unimaginable image of being.

**J.P. Limnell**  
**University of Tampere**

## **David Bohm and the Art of Perceiving Movement**

According to David Bohm movement is fundamental. Some philosophers and authors have held time as a fundamental, irreducible entity. Some have held that consciousness is fundamental and primitive. Physicists generally think that quantum fields are ontologically fundamental. Bohm sees that time, space, quantum fields (matter in general) and perhaps even consciousness can be deduced from movement that fundamentally gives shape to all forms. In traditional thought things are the subjects of motion, movement and change. Bohm sees it the other way around: movement is primary and things and entities emerge out of movement and dissolve back into it. The general form of this movement, according to Bohm, in his implicate order metaphysics, is

“holomovement” (the totality of movement of unfoldment and enfoldment). Implicate order is thought to be a dynamical process of change and development. Bohm’s basic idea of the supremacy of movement and change can be seen in the following:

[A]ll things found in the unfolded, explicate order emerge from the holomovement in which they are enfolded as potentialities, and ultimately they fall back to it. They endure only for some time, and while they last, their existence is sustained in a constant process of unfoldment and re-enfoldment, which gives rise to their relatively stable and independent forms in the explicate order (Bohm 1990: 273).

While emphasizing the meaning of movement and change as constitutive for the whole universe, Bohm is building up a world view, which challenges traditional ways to see and think about the world as a collection of permanent and moving things. This view has its metaphysical form in process philosophy (that leads us back at least to Heraclites in western philosophy). Bohm’s work in the field of modern physics (relativity and quantum) has led him to see the world in new ways. Bohm has realized how physics, theory development of scientists, perception, child’s development, and the works of artists (etc.) all emerge or spring out from movement and change. My aim in this talk is to give a general outline of Bohm’s way to think of movement as fundamental and to show how Bohm himself related his thoughts to psychology, consciousness, perception, general metaphysics (process philosophy) and art and language. The key issue, however, is in explicating Bohm’s idea of movement as fundamental from the philosophical point of view.

**Tuomas Mali**

### **Kinaesthetic experiences and musical interpretation: considerations from a pianists point of view**

Conventional ways to deal with and speak about western classical music focus on performances of musical works. Interpretations are considered to be fixed and unchanging cultural artefacts. For example dynamic changes, rhythmic alterations, articulations, ornamentation, and ways of phrasing are understood as properties of aesthetic objects created by performers. Musicians, and their performances, are compared to each other on the ground of these properties.

For me, as a pianist playing a lot of new music, to interpret means to deal with movement and change. The learning-process of any piece of music is practically endless and ever-changing, and aims to a flexible mental and bodily readiness to cope with varying situations and conditions. New music often removes me from my habitual ways of acting, thinking and experiencing – and sometimes other people are moved by my playing. When preparing a performance, I do strive for considered and controlled rendering of the music, but a fixed “end product” is not

my primary goal. Various different ways to play may give me satisfaction: playing twice similarly would be not only impossible, but pointless.

The two experiences described above may be interpreted as reflecting two different approaches to movement and change. The first can be associated with Galileis notion that the book of nature is written in mathematics: with the influence classical mechanics has had to our understanding and interests. The other has been discussed for example in phenomenological literature concerned with the constitution of reality. What is of importance here is, that understanding and role of the lived, moving body is significantly different.

In my daily practising with the piano I repeat little gestures, passages and leaps hundreds of times, listening to the physical, visual and aural experiences of my body. The importance of developed kinaesthetic sensitivity is a commonplace – a starting-point and a result of the practising, at the same time. Through repetitions I learn to sense and feel the possibilities and limits of the given music within my moving (and ever-changing) body, which allows me to experience qualities of music without intermediary thought.

In my presentation I articulate and examine my own playing-experiences from a bodily-oriented point of view, using the learning-process of Oliver Kohlenbergs Piano Sonata No. 3 as an example. My special interest is on the role of kinaesthetic experiences in the constitution of my interpretation.

**Britt Normann**

**The University of Tromsø/Nordland Hospital, Bodø**

### **The embodied self – a perspective to broaden the understanding of MS-patients' experiences with physiotherapy**

This study is about MS-patients' experiences with neurological physiotherapy as a new element in the multidisiplinary package for outpatients at the Nordland Hospital. The current study highlights the significance of the patients' movement experiences during a systematic and individualized assessment which includes exploration of possibilities for change.

The study contains a strategic sample of 12 MS-patients, enclosing a variety of conditions in the MS-population. The assessments were observed and videotaped, followed by an in-depth interview of the 12 patients. Parts of the videotape where the patients express feelings and experiences related to movement were transcribed as well as all the interviews. A content-analysis was performed producing a summary of the transcribed material, terminating with three topics: "bodily relationships", "changes" and "I can – I know". These categories were exemplified and analyzed in a hermeneutic phenomenological

framework based on Merleau-Ponty`s theory of the body and Leder`s publications.

The results show that the patients express surprise and appreciation that the physiotherapist addresses the whole body – both affected and non-affected parts as well as their expressions – while exploring activities of daily life and the patients` prerequisites for these by using: Observation, movement, physical handling and verbal dialogue, challenging the patients` perception and ability to change. The patients` experiences during this interaction may be interpreted as pre-reflective perceptions as living bodies. In this perspective, the patients experience the physiotherapist`s interest in what the embodied self expresses, not only what the patients are able to tell through words. These perceptions seem to give the patients new knowledge about themselves.

The physiotherapist`s observations and individually and carefully adjusted handling to explore the patients` alignment, muscular activity, sensation and perception may be interpreted as an assessment of the lived body`s prerequisites for intentionality. The adapted physical interaction may be seen as an investigation of what the lived body expresses pre-reflectively and comprehended as an exploration of areas where the relationship between the body as a subject and as an object is displaced. The patients` experiences of reduced pain, increased range of movement, less effort and improved sensation in hands and feet followed with simultaneous improvement in walking, may be understood as changed intentionality due to changes in the unit of motility, sensation and perception. The experienced transformation from “I can not” to “I can” related to functional movement may be interpreted as a starting incorporation of new knowledge or new access to more of the former “habitual body” as a prerequisite for the “present body”.

The patients` pre-reflective experience as living bodies partly becomes conscious through active exploration of their own movement during physical interaction and dialogue with the physiotherapist. New knowledge is incorporated and makes the world more accessible. In the perspective of the embodiment, the physical interaction may be termed as communication between two embodied selves.

The theory of embodiment broadens the understanding of patients` experiences through movement and expands the theoretical basis for physiotherapy.

Keywords: Movement, experience, physiotherapy, embodiment, intentionality, MS-patients

**Teemu Paavolainen**  
**Dept of Literature and the Arts / University of Tampere**

## **Mise-en-scène in motion: movement-related implications of theatrical objects**

The paper will proceed in roughly three sections. At the outset, I will point out some inadequacies of traditional scenographic vocabulary such as “scenery,” “props,” and “costume,” for discussing material objects in theatrical performances. As many a scholar has shown, these alleged categories will easily morph into one another, as the performance proceeds: for early Prague-school semiotician Jiri Veltruský, “scenic spontaneity” was a matter of what he enigmatically called “action force,” for historian of props Andrew Sofer, objects “become props” when physically manipulated by actors. As is often the case with human categories, thus, the boundaries are inescapably “fuzzy”: without dismissing the above contributions, the first part of my argument is to replace their vocabulary by that of James Gibson’s ecological psychology, and especially, by his famous concept of “affordances” – “what [the environment] offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.” In the ecological scenario – given that most often the materiality of theatrical objects remains even as they come to signify different things – it is little short of redundant to speak of objects “becoming props,” or even of things becoming objects; what can and will change is their relationship with the actor/s (read: affordances) either actual or performed – and in terms of this conference, most of these affordances will both enable and constrain varieties of movement (whether of the actors, or of the material objects they manipulate).

The second part will briefly expand on Veltruský’s key finding (1940) that neither actors nor objects can be “delimited as a closed sphere,” in the theatre, drawing on developmental psychology and cognitive anthropology, on the one hand (ontological “domains” and their violations), yet keeping with the Gibsonian/ecological emphasis on perception and on “invariance” in movement. Perceptually, as it happens, the distinction of the animate and the inanimate appears simple enough, for ecological and cognitive psychology, alike: prototypically, the former move on their own, in nonrigid trajectories, and respond to their environment, whereas the latter neither respond nor move, unless externally caused to move, in which case they do so in a more or less predictable manner. Simplistic as these definitions may sound, the value of such perceptual “clues” lies in the utter easiness of simulating them, on stage – given how Veltruský himself speaks of “perceiv[ing objects] as spontaneous” (though surely the boundary with “conceiving” is as fuzzy as any) and the emphasis on movement, manipulation, and perception not only in discussions of theatrical objects but in the conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson, the concluding part of my argument can only agree on his most fundamental thesis concerning the social implications (worldview-wise) of “question[ing] the relationship between man and things” in the theatre. If, as Lakoff and others

suggest, the central prototype for our diverse concepts of “causation” – the most abstract, social and metaphysical varieties included – indeed comes down to object manipulation, the metaphorical implications of whether a mode of performance is generally “moved by” actors or objects become more than emergent.

**Elina Paju**  
**University of Helsinki**

### **Children’s movements in the space of a day care centre**

I am conducting an ethnographic research on children’s action and agency in day care as my Ph.D. study in sociology. I employ an embodied and materialist view on children’s actions and the context of day care. I have produced my data during the school year 2003-2004 in two day care groups, in which the children were aged from 3 to 5, and 5 to 6 respectively. Both of the day care groups were open 24/7. My data consists of fieldnotes, video-material, photographs and interviews with both the children and the staff.

In my research I analyse the movements of children in day care from various angles, i.e. movement as a form non-verbal communication among the children, movement as a way of dominating space, movement as an acquired body technique in the every day order of the day care. In my presentation I will concentrate on children’s movements in the material space of the day care centre, i.e. in relation to building materials of the space, the placing and design of doorways, furniture etc. In the everyday life of the children in day care, both the material setting and the (pedagogically structured) order of the day care shape the space in which children move. From this point, children’s movements can partly be seen as ways of reacting and also contesting the space, the order and the spatial order of the day care. I argue that even if movement and the material surroundings of a moving body can be at times seen as quite routinely intertwined in a way that suggests that the body inhabits space on a pre-reflective level, the movements of children also take space up and grab the materiality of space in a far more active way.

**Heidrun Panhofer & Helen Payne**  
**Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona - Autonomous University of Barcelona**

### **New approaches to communicate embodied psychotherapeutic practice**

Essential tools in Dance Movement Psychotherapy (DMP) are to mirror, synchronize, amplify, and interact with the client’s movement material not solely in movement but also in words. Just like a mirror and narrator, the therapist aims

to help a client to find words for their embodied experience, kinaesthetic perception, emotional response or train of thought.

However, there is no research to date on how the embodied experience can be verbalized. This inquiry explores other ways of verbalizing the embodied experience and inquires into the essentially subjective undertaking of yielding meaning in the movement (Daly, 1988). The researcher's concern is the successful communication of profound inner experiences from one human being to another. The research explores links between movement and narration, the possibility to word the embodied experience (Sheets-Johnstone, in press 2008; Parviainen, 2002, 2003; Ylönen, 2003, 2004), particularly including the subjective experience of the therapist.

The approach has been concentrated on the significant moments in therapy (Campbell et al 2003; Elliott et al 1994; Friedlaender et al 1994). These noteworthy moments of change are the basis for a further investigation through writing and moving, parting from the written word through an embodied experience and coming back to the written word.

The procedures have its roots in a threefold methodology structure:

1. Artistic research methodologies (Hannula, 2004; McNiff, 1986, 1992, 1993, 1998; Nevanlinna, 2004; Wadsworth, 2000) underline the creative process which is the very heart of the Creative Arts Therapies.
2. Movement and dance as a method of inquiry (Cdordas, 1993; Riley, 2004; Smith, 2002; Koltai, 1994;) allow for an integration of the embodiment approaches which are gaining more recognition in a wide range of disciplines (Riley, 2004; Berrol, 2006) due to recent neuropsychological findings (Carroll, 2006; Panksepp, 2006a, 2006b; Damasio, 1994, 1999); philosophical paradigms (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1964; Bourdieu, 1977; Sheets-Johnstone, 1999; Fuchs, 2001, 2004) and cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson 2003).
3. Writing as a form of analysis (Reason and Hawkins, 1988; Sparkes, 2002, 2003; Wolcott, 1994) making use of the process of composition and the textual product itself (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996).

First results of the study, which belongs to a bigger project, will be presented, including the importance of the embodied experience in order to investigate significant moments from the therapeutic process. Movement not only triggers memories, but also associations, and brings the therapist closer to his/her countertransference experience. However, shifting from writing to moving and back to writing, highlights how the embodied experience often reduces the embodied word, concentrating its content and discounting technical jargon. First conclusions of the study propose this technique for supervision, but also suggest its use for any embodied psychotherapeutic practice.

**Jaana Parviainen**  
**University of Tampere**

## **Choreographing Resistances: Kinaesthetic Intelligence and Bodily Knowledge as Political Tools in Activist Work**

Bodies have been used as a powerful political tool in activist work. They have been used as instruments or objects in campaigns where bodies are placed in the front of bulldozers, chained to trees, and marched down the main streets of the cities. These demonstrations and performances are called here as resisting choreographies and choreographing resistances (Foster 2003). They can be spontaneous gestures or carefully organized media campaigns. Resisting choreographies can be directed for or against various things: human rights, world peace, nuclear power, trade unions, foxhunting, G8, or global warming.

By introducing a few of resisting choreographies during the last two decades, I reflect on the power of gestures. Why was a single gesture deadly for a male clerk in the 1989 Chinese student movement? Why does group crawling on the main street in Helsinki arouse a lot of emotions in passers-by in 2007? Media and IT play a central role in organizing these events, for instance, in Greenpeace's carefully designed shrewd choreographies.

The resistance, reflexivity and reflectivity of gestures are leitmotifs in this paper. Instead of focusing on the body's physical force or symbolic meanings in these demonstrations (Sharp 1973), I reflect on the body's fragility and vulnerability. Drawing on the phenomenology of the body (Sheets-Johnstone 1999; Gallagher 2005), theories of choreography, performing studies and political science, I suggest that social choreographers have kinaesthetic intelligence and bodily knowledge of reigning over public spaces by gestures and movements during these events. Resisting choreographies are essentially dialectic usually dangerous to its performers because of their stunning, amusing, irritating or infuriating acts.

The paper suggests contrary to Lakoff and Johnson (1999) that morality does not easily emerge from and addresses itself to our embodied experience. It requires public events in which performers interrogate the embodied limits of the morality of the society by receiving spontaneous responds of spectators and authorities. The paper also wants to show that the core element of kinesthetic intelligence (Gardner 1983) is not only control of one's bodily motion, but a sense of kinaesthetic fields (Husserl 1973) in which we are involved.

**Päivi Pylvänäinen a clinical psychologist, dance therapist (MS in psychology, MA in Creative Arts in Therapy - DMT)  
Tampereen kaupungin avomielenterveyspalvelut, psykiatrian poliklinikka**

## **The dance/movement therapy group in psychiatric clinic - explorations in the body image and interaction**

This presentation discusses the clinical experiences gained in the use of dance/movement therapy (DMT) at the psychiatric clinic of Tampere City since 2007. The DMT group has been offered in 10-sessions periods. By the time of writing this abstract there has been five groups.

The clinical work has been built on the tradition of DMT and on the recent findings in neurobiology and interaction (Siegel, Schore, Gallagher). The knowledge about the functions of the right hemisphere in creating the sense of corporeal body-self; in processing motor information, emotion and memories; and in interaction has offered a theoretical explanation for the significance of the movement experiences. This knowledge has allowed the group members new understanding on human beings.

Based on the therapist's written session blogs it is possible to see what was the process each group moved through over the treatment period. The processes of the five groups demonstrate issues that the patients with depression, anxiety and chronic pain discover and work on. The creative nature of DMT has allowed the group members to unfold these themes through movement explorations and body oriented awareness and mindfulness.

The group processes can be seen as a triad of positive expectations/experiences, the shadow and the resolution. Group members have positive experiences of the release of tension, relaxation, joy and the pleasure of movement. However, the shadow often appears in experiences. The DMT group aims at using the constructive elements of movement to support the patient while s/he is in the process of encountering the shadow struggles. The improved sense of the body-image, safer grounding in the body-self, and increased awareness of the body sensations, movement abilities and movement options offer the patient a stronger sense of the body-self which builds the sense of trust, safety and mastery in one-self.

In the group process the patients encounter, move, and talk about their shadow contents. These themes have included feelings of tiredness and lack of energy, anxiety, emotional and physical pain, difficulty in being in the group and interacting with others, aggression, demands and feelings of guilt, memories of the past interactions and relationships, negative and critical image of one-self. The group gradually works its way through these themes in movement and words and creates a resolution.

The contents of the resolution have included experiences of connectedness and sharing in the group, taming of anxiety and finding tolerable ways to be with it, finding interest and a caring attitude towards one's body. After the DMT group process the members are grasping the body oriented attitude and have improved their connectedness to their body. They are more grounded in their body, which enables them to function in a more grounded, aware and resourceful way. This is a basis they can then continue to flow with.

**Zdravko Radman**  
**Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb (Croatia)**

## **The Motivated Movement**

In more recent times challenging new explorations have been done on grasping (M. Jeannerod), gesturing (D. McNeill, A. Clark, G. Calbris), touching (M. Ratcliffe), and pointing (S. Kelly), yet a more holistic approach to the kinesthetic living body seems to be needed. An attempt will be made in this paper to try to relate simple movements (cutting a cake or driving a car) as embedded into more complex behavioral situations (having a desert or being exposed to the traffic). The latter is also to include the symbolic or cultural. The "knowing body" emerges then as a consequence of the proposed approach. Such a body inhabits the space that is by no means neutral, but is rather meaningfully structured (whereby meaningfulness is not to be reduced exclusively to the propositionality). The "corporeal competence" thus far outgrows mechanical skills and is to be perceived as belonging to cultural experience.

**Sound Designer Antti Nykyri (MA in Theatre Arts) Dance Artists Leena Rouhiainen (Doctor of Arts in Dance)**  
**Theatre Academy, Department of Research Development, Helsinki**

## **Movement and sound in the performance Passage (Väylä)**

In this presentation we will discuss Passage (Väylä), a cross-artistic performance created by architect Toni Kaupila, fashion designer Marita Huurinainen, sound designer Antti Nykyri and dancer Leena Rouhiainen. Through an open process the group generated a site-specific environment consisting of music, dance, video-projections as well as architectonic and clothing constructions. The performance combined impressions of rest, movement, urban spaces and travel.

We will especially pay attention to the improvised dialogue between the dancer and sound designer. Psychologist and creativity researcher Keith Sawyer discusses improvisation as an unpredictable, free-flowing group interaction, in which the process is the product. It includes the complexity of concrete face-to-face communication that depends on what he terms interactional synchrony. The

term relates to our capacity to interact relying on both verbal and nonverbal levels and synchronize our behavior socially, culturally, semiotically and rhythmically with those of others. It can be argued that interactional synchrony creates a kind of collective embodiment and relies upon a form of thinking in action.

In the realm of dance this has been discussed through the concept of thinking in movement that was originally promoted by philosopher Maxine Sheets-Johnstone in her analysis of dance improvisation. Following her Jaana Parviainen discusses bodily knowledge as an if-then-structure, which implies that such knowledge requires interaction with the environment: in moving and manipulating the world we learn both about our bodily abilities as well as the qualitative features of our environment. Thinking in movement is tied to this structure and relies on the expressiveness any bodily gesture possesses, be it a body that is extended with a technical device or a “plain” human body. In dancing, the significance dancing has for the dancing subject emerges and is perceptible in and through her body as she dances. In light and sound design the feedback loop is extended between the felt-sense of playing an instrument and the hearing of the sound permeating the room or between experiencing fixing and directing a lamp to perceiving the light that fills a space. Sheets-Johnstone further describes the nature of thinking in movement by writing that: “To think in movement is not to think in monolithic compartmental wholes: eating, mating, courting, defending, aggressing, threatening, and so on; it is to think in dynamic terms – in terms of speed, postural orientation, range of movement, force, direction, and so on.”

How did we experience our improvisation? What kinds of intensities and dynamics did we react to? How does sound affect the dancer movement and how does movement affect the improvising musician? What kind of a motional and sonic space is thus created?

**Erika Ruonakoski**

**Lahti University of Applied Sciences & University of Helsinki**

### **Flying, sniffing, pecking, stinging: non-human animals in action**

The aim of this paper is to discuss movements of non-human animals from the viewpoint of Merleau-Pontian phenomenology of the body. I will argue that even though one’s own body and its movements is the norm for understanding other kinds of movements, one’s mode of experience is constantly put into question, and, up to a point, extended and transformed by our encounters with non-human ways of moving. In fact, there are animals, such as birds and fish that reveal whole elements to us in a way that is foreign to our own embodiment. A bird reveals air no longer as merely something that surrounds us as empty space or something that can be inhaled, but as a medium for movement, and as possible

flying routes. And when we see fish in the sea, this sea is no longer only a place to dip in on a warm summer day but a place to dwell in.

Bodily understanding of non-human animals through empathy seems to depend on two things: firstly, on the type of an animal's body (for instance, whether the animal has a face or not), and secondly, on the animal's style of moving. The caressing movements of an elephant's trunk can be easily empathized with, even though we as humans do not have trunks. On the other hand, when a parrot holds a nut in his foot while eating, this movement is paired with my hand as a means of putting food into my mouth. Even though I do not have primordial experience of holding food in my hand at that moment, I may go into the flow or rhythm of the other's movements, and, consequently, feel his intentions in my own body. However, the other's bodily differences produce an experience of displacement or even collision: something familiar (a human-like way of moving) is displaced to a different kind of context, a non-human body. In some instances, this collision is experienced as baffling, and, finally, as amusing.

I will study different ways of moving in relation to our own ways of moving, and the meaning of these movements to us. I will consider the new meanings that the movements of non-human animals reveal to us, reciprocal movements between humans and non-human animals, and, in particular, moving together with a non-human animal. In addition, I will describe perceiving a motionless animal corpse and discuss the possibility of empathy in this case. Consequently, also the general conditions of possibility for empathy will be elucidated.

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## **Seeing the Light in John 1:1 Through Heidegger's 'On the Essence of Truth'**

Let us substitute "The Word" with "Saying" (active verb) to constitute the Greek Logos. Saying is an active event instead of a noun, or fixed substance. The substitutions will allow us to move through the full proclamation of John 1:1, which itself is composed of three parts ('in beginning was the word, the word was with the god and god was the word'). But everything changes with the substitution within the term Logos. Our hypothesis involves a chiasmic ontological-theological act: the movement traces an event inside the three parts of the full statement about God, and it is Heidegger's "On the Essence of Truth," which can provide the lens to see what this movement traces. Are we seeing the living God in the movement of the movement's un-concealing?

God happens in an original way one can say. But this subsumes the parts within a whole statement that constitutes a single act. Here Heidegger's "On the Essence of Truth" is especially helpful in our illumination of John 1:1's mystery.

God is the happening of the original in which the saying occurs as a relation or communion of God as Truth. This transcends the flatness or inertia or lifelessness of a subject-predicate constitution: 'God is Truth' or 'God is Word.' We have to ponder the interrelations of the three sets of three as it constitutes the Event of Truth's Disclosure. This ontological ground of moving relations makes possible the meaning of what appears to us in the surface of the single statements in Koine Greek, transliterated Greek, Latin and the literal English (taken from Wikipedia: John 1:1)

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## **The midwife case and embodied cognition**

An important aspect of Embodied Cognition is the so called 'physical grounding project' that involves: '.understanding how cognitive contents must ground out in (terms of) the agent's embodied experience and physical characteristics' (Anderson 2003, p. 92).

In Collins et al. (2006) it was demonstrated that so-called interactional expertise, developed through linguistic interaction without full scale practical immersion in a culture, exists (see also Collins 2004; Collins 2007). In their ability to use language, interactional experts are indistinguishable from so-called contributory experts, who on the other hand are identified by their full scale practical immersion in the specialist area under discussion. Seemingly, interactional and contributory experts differ with respect to their source of knowledge. While contributory experts gain their explicit knowledge from explicit discourse and theorizing, imbued with analytical and logical rationality (and implicit linguistic knowledge) as well as actual bodily experiences, imbued with irrational, non-logical and holistic experiences, interactional experts gain their knowledge solely from discourse and theorizing (including implicit linguistic knowledge).

To explore the extent to which embodied knowledge is significant to language, we ran experiments employing the procedure presented in Collins et al. (2006) using midwives who were or were not themselves mothers. According to the idea of interactional experts, midwives without the experience of giving birth should be linguistically indistinguishable from midwives that had given birth due to years of immersion in the community.

Contrary to the findings on perfect pitch and colour blindness reported in the study by Collins et al., our results seem to suggest that bodily knowledge does have a significant impact on linguistic skills.

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## **The kinaesthesia of exile and home: an example from canadian immigrant literature**

This paper is the first in a new project on movement and immigration literature. It builds on and expands my doctoral dissertation "The Constitution of Movement in Rudy Wiebe's fiction: A Phenomenological Study of Three Mennonite Novels" (Ph. D diss., Stockholm University, 2006).

My doctoral thesis investigated movement as a phenomenon of constituting directedness in the Canadian writer Rudy Wiebe's work, with a particular focus on movements of migration, violence and regeneration, but also on narrative movement and focalization. The novels studied—*Peace Shall Destroy Many* (1962), *The Blue Mountains of China* (1970), and *Sweeter Than All the World* (2001)—display a peculiarly kinetic-kinaesthetic focus in their vocabulary choice and narrative structure, which is also strengthened by the historical backdrop of the Mennonite people, as described in the novels. The Mennonite movement originates in the Anabaptist branch of the Protestant Reformation. This religious movement, born in the religious experience of regeneration, was soon doubled into being also a physical movement of migration, exile and persecution, that over the following centuries took the group from Central Europe to Poland, Russia and China, North and South America.

One part of the thesis initiates an examination of the complex sense of home expressed in the novels. There is a homesickness that comes to expression in the novels, which grows interesting with the strongly religious and reclusive Mennonites, since it concerns both the geographical places left during centuries of migration and exile, and the theological place, i.e the eschatological home—the true and only home, which is always "over there," with God. Both these longings come out in the singing of *Heimatleeda*, the songs of home. *Heimatleeda* as a phenomenon will be further investigated in this paper. Since the songs and the continual wandering/exile of the Mennonites' coincide, there is a sense where for these people wandering is home as movement and movement as home. In an eschatological sense, even the kinetics of moving away in exile has the kinaesthetic quality of home.

In the paper, as in the thesis, I will continue to explore these phenomena using the phenomenological insights of both Edmund Husserl and Maxine Sheets Johnstone. Husserl's conceptualization of phenomenological directedness (e.g. in *Time and Space*) and Sheets Johnstone's development of that into the concept of kinaesthesia (*The Primacy of Movement*) will be of particular importance for the discussion.

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## **The musicality of movement**

This paper discusses an approach towards kinaesthesia and motion from the viewpoint of the phenomenological study of music. In particular, we will relate to the experience of what is called 'tempo' and 'rhythm', two interrelated dimensions of agency and experience that have central relevance for the temporal organization of moving and movement.

(1.) In order to demonstrate the close interrelatedness of rhythm and animate motion, we will distinguish two regulating principles guiding the generation of rhythmic structures. The first is based in the animate-bodily practice of walking and its different variations, resulting in a series of units of motion (also misleadingly called 'beats') being organized in patterns of two: a binary rhythm. The second is based in the experience of breathing, with tension and relaxation alternating in mostly regular, but hardly equal, intervals. The result is a ternary rhythmic structure, which may be composed as a result of a rhythmical grouping (like  $2 + 1$  or  $4 + 3$  or  $3 + 3 + 2$ ).

(2.) Motion essentially is qualified by being performed in a specific tempo. To approach the notion of tempo, we will discuss how tempo can be distinguished from speed. As it has often been argued, western traditions tend to think and speak about temporal phenomena in terms taken from the sphere of spatial experience. Duration is being equated with 'extension' and events are conceived as single spots, 'points in time'. In this context, tempo only can exist as 'speed', defining how fast I can get from one point in time to the next.

Whereas 'speed' is defined as independent of the experiencing subject, tempo is one of the concepts grounded in everyday-life, which have a phenomenological nucleus. It is based on structuring a succession due to a pace of reference, resulting in a specific modification of mood instead of being a mere matter of fast and slow.

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## **„Le promeneur dans le jardin”: a phenomenological description of spatial experience**

One of the issues tackled by phenomenology, beginning with Husserl's, is that of the perception of spatial objects, and the role of one's own body (“Leib”, “corps propre”) in constituting that perception. Husserl's theory of the lived-body and the body's motility in perceiving the life-world was further developed by Merleau-Ponty who considered the body as a body-subject, always-already-in-the-world, source of a pre-conscious practical knowledge. The body, through its actions, is directed-toward-the-world: it is thus the motility (the ability for movement) of the body-subject, the „I can” that forms the primordial consciousness-toward, the primordial intentionality. Similar thoughts had been already developed earlier by thinkers such as Erwin Straus. He analysed the different modes of being-in-the-world, such as the spatio-temporal modes of „here” and „there”, whose structures are defined by the bodily projects opened to the body-subject by the „I can”.

In the present paper, I will look at „designed space” such as a garden, not as a backdrop for our perception of spatial objects, but as a spatial object of its own kind, whose experience can be described following the phenomenological framework outlined above. Through the changes or continuity in specific sensory experiences that occur as we move through space, combined with distant views and memory of what we have already seen, we experience the garden as a succession of units combined into structured wholes. The garden invites motion through its spatial form, by offering the possibility for heightened experiences of ‘here’ – views, objects, spaces seen on axis - and ‘there’ – views and objects in a distance, that we feel we can reach. But more subtly, the garden can accompany the transition from the fulfillment of being ‘here’ to the desire of going ‘there’ and enrich through such transitions our motion itself.

The present paper seeks thus to explore how the composed space of a garden – here specifically the garden of Versailles – makes use of these primordial modes of relating-to-the-world, structured by the bodily intentionality available to human motility, to allow the visitor to build through time a differentiated and meaningful aesthetic experience of the space of the garden.

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## **Kinaesthetic self-awareness and the phenomenology of alien limbs and thought insertions**

With the proposed presentation I will attempt to deal, from the perspective of a

constitutive Phenomenological Psychology, with alien limb experiences, as also, in a suggested parallelism, with thought insertion phenomena. Based on Husserlian grounds, I will start with the exploration of the thesis that pre-reflective, pre-thematic (functioning) lived-body is itself constituted in the process of perceptual constitution. Arguing that the disclosure of different constitutive levels is phenomenologically legitimate, and so drawing from Husserl's analyses in *Ideas II*, I will focus on the crucial role of the various kinaesthetic systems for the constitution of the lived body as mine. Here, emphasis will be put on the issue of the localisation of the sensings. I will then be in a position to show how alien limb phenomena can be phenomenologically interpreted under the prism of the malfunction of some kinaesthetic sub-system.

An alien limb, although, as I claim, it is constituted in its material reality, is 'deprived of life' as far as it remains kinaesthetically unknown. In an analogous way, I will treat thought insertion phenomena. I will examine the phenomenology of the different ways a thought is given as "mine" (in thought, memory, remembrance, etc.) taking advantage of Husserl's analyses about solitary life found in the first *Logical Investigation*. Finally, then, an inserted thought will show up as, on the one hand, experienced 'in my head,' but, on the other, as not kinaesthetically recognisable as "mine."

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### **Intersensorial/intersubjective aspects of motion – or a renaissance of “sensus communis”**

The motion of a lived body is a vehicle of manifold integrations: joins the inside and the outside experiences, passivity and spontaneity, affection and comprehension. Movement connects various sensorial modalities and at the same time creates unconscious vital attunement of different persons.

This paper focuses on intersensorial and intersubjective capacity of movement, especially on the very connection of intermodal and intercorporeal aspects. This intertwining has become a central theme of several contemporary theories, such as the new phenomenological philosophy since Maurice Merleau-Ponty, or the psychological model of self-development created by Daniel Stern. Stern describes the so called “vitality affects” – the primordial forms of corporal and affective communication, which are responsible for the intersensorial transition and makes possible intersubjective relations. Merleau-Ponty's thoughts about the “intercorporeity” or “operative intentionality of the body” are very close to Stern's analysis. Both theories claim that higher forms of consciousness and personal development have their roots in the work of our intersensorial-intercorporeal capacities. The disclosure of this tacit world-constitution leads us back to the core of our existence, our personal and universal world-understanding.

Nevertheless intertwining of intersensorial and intersubjective experiences is not a new theme in the history of philosophy. Aristotle connected these dimensions also, unfolding the theme of “sixth sense”, or “sensus communis”. For him this intersensorial capacity connects not only the five senses, but bears an element of self-reflection and creates a primordial sympathy connecting us to other people and to the whole universe. The excessive rationalization since the XVIIth century simplified this Aristotelian tradition and isolated human senses and human persons as well.

So the parallel return of contemporary phenomenology and psychology to the investigating of the intersensorial-intercorporeal strata of human existence encourages us to cope with alienated aspects of modern thinking and to perceive our world and ourselves in different ways. We can realize our inherence in a moving world, and feel the pain and pleasure of our vital and spiritual interdependence. This refreshed an integrated experience of movement opens up new theoretical dimensions for phenomenology and new therapeutic potentialities for movement therapies, too. The deepening of intersensorial and intercorporeal aspects of our life leads us at the same time to the deepening of our personal and theoretical responsibilities.

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### **Experiences of movements of musical hands - a case study of a professional harpsichord player**

The way in which a musician feels the movements of his/her musical hands and body in a playing situation is a very specific way of being in the world. The instrument is not just an object but rather an extension of the player's body so that the body and the instrument appear to be experienced as one (Stubley 1998, 95). In this wholeness the handmovements have made up instrument-specifically during a long time and they have a close connection to the music being played during the many years of practising. For musicians playing is the primary way of experiencing music but different instruments have their own characteristic qualities and they bring about different ways of experiencing the playing (Arho 2003, 172).

In the tradition of classical music instrument lessons are an important part of the learning process. Learning to play an instrument means that the technical and musical exercises are controlled by an instrument teacher. In most cases it takes 10 to 15 years to learn appropriate positions and modes of playing. Step by step the student becomes more capable and learns to practice independently at home. Especially in keyboard instruments the movements of hands and fingers are a part of the improving technic but they are also paths to music. Learning to

play an instrument basically means to surpass the technical problems and to learn music versatily in order to finally become a mediator of music.

The term musical hands means here a skill, a spesific sensitivity to musical qualities translated to movements of the musical hands that feel and interpret music with an instrument.

In this case study I examine playing experiences of a professional harpsichord player, Laura, who lives and practices in Finland. She was born in 1960 in Helsinki and has studied harpsichord playing at Sibelius-Academy. She has continued her studies in Netherlands. She generally performs standard French, Italian and English harpsichord repertoire from the 17th and 18th centuries.

The focus in my study is the imprortant role of the performer's hand movements in the technical and musical processes in practising and performing music. My attitude is phenomenological. I try to answer the following questions:

What kind of meanings do the movements of musical hands and fingers have to the player herself? How have the feelings of the musical hands changed in time? Is musical sound or opportunely musical tempo an important part of the experiences of the musical hands moving?

The data consists of videotapes in which Laura is playing J. S. Bach and audiotapes of conversation processes we had together. She was both a subject of the research process but also a kind of co-researcher by reflecting aloud and deeply the qualities of her musical hands. An essential backround of my interpretations of her movements was also my own musical body. On grounds of my own playing experiences I could emphatize her playing, her talking about playing and the importance of playing to her whole life. On the other hand my own musical body did not answer to all of the questions, especially those that came out in situations that made difference to my own experiences of playing. Interpreting meanings of the musical movements of another person on grounds of one's own experiences is still a deep methodological question that remains open and still very absorbing.

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